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Some Thoughts on Judicial Review 
and Collaborative Governance 
Michael Herz• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A, perhaps the, central and never-to-be-resolved debate in American adminis-
trative law concerns this: to what extent should agencies be left to their own de-
vices? Were the answer "completely," then there would be no such thing as ad-
ministrative law. There would be administrative lore, and administrative practice, 
and administrative culture, and administrative functions. But administrative law 
consists of the doctrines, statutes, and regulations that limit agency discretion and 
subject agencies to various forms of oversight. 1 
The most obvious answer to the question of the extent to which agencies 
should be left to their own devices is, "It depends." It depends on many things; 
prominently, it depends on what it is the agency is doing. Congress, the President, 
and the courts all oversee, influence, and review agencies, but not always, and 
with varying degrees of stringency and directive authority depending on the cir-
cumstances. In this article, I will consider whether the nature of one form of over-
sight-judicial review--should be affected by the fact that a particular agency 
action resulted from a collaborative process.2 
Under current law, the fact that an agency action grows out of a collaborative 
process does not affect the availability or scope of judicial review. For one thing, 
most collaborative undertakings lack a specific statutory basis; they are the result 
of agency initiative and experimentation. Accordingly, there is nothing to dis-
place the existing, default statutory regime for judicial review.3 Second, courts, 
for reasons of habit and a predictability juro-centric view of the world, are not 
quick to conclude that an agency innovation should be exempt from ordinary re-
view.4 Third, the one significant example of a collaborative governance regime. 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Thanks, of course, 
to Phil Harter, for inviting me to participate in this symposium, for helpful comments on my presenta-
tion, and for his many contributions to the field . 
I . As one casebook puts it: 
Most broadly, administrative law might be defined as legal control of government. More narrow-
ly, we might say that administrative law consists of those legal principles that define the authority 
and structure of administrative agencies, specify the procedural formalities that agencies use, de-
termine the validity of administrative decisions, and outline the role of reviewing courts and other 
organs of government in their relation to administrative agencies. 
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL. , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PoUCY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, 
AND CASES 2-3 (6th ed. 2006). 
2. I will use the terms "collaborative governance" and "negotiated rulemaking" (or "reg-neg") 
interchangeably. I recognize, of course, that the latter is a subset of the former; but it is the predomi-
nant example and the one that has received the most attention. 
3. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006) (Administrative Procedure Act provisions governing judicial 
review of final agency action) . 
4. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1459 (1997) 
[hereinafter Wald, ADR and the Courts] ("[R]eg neg rules usually involve some aspect of public poli-
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established by statute, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA),5 by its terms does 
nothing to displace particular agency statutes or the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). Its procedures all precede and supplement those required by the APA, 
which means that the AP A's judicial review provisions, mechanisms, and assump-
tions remain in place. Indeed, the NRA expressly states that a reviewing court is 
not supposed to accord a negotiated rule any special deference.6 Such rules have 
generally been upheld, usually with no or only passing reference to their reg-neg 
pedigree.7 To the extent courts have considered whether that pedigree should 
influence their review, they have concluded that it should not.8 
The question is whether that is correct. 
II. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS 
The debate over the extent to which agencies should be left alone in tum in-
volves a second fundamental debate, this one about whether agencies are techno-
cratic experts or are just doing what makes sense to them in light of political con-
siderations and their own values and preferences.9 If they are experts, then over-
sight-which by definition will be performed by a person or body with less skill 
and knowledge-can only cause problems. This is particularly true, perhaps, of 
oversight by elected officials (also known as "political hacks"); but the point also 
applies to judges, whose motivations may be more pure but who lack expertise 
and technical training. Thus, it is familiar, if perhaps slightly oversimplified, his-
cy. Given this, I would not have expected courts to give them any less searching a review than they 
would apply to rules consummated entirely through regular procedures."); Patricia M. Wald, Negotia-
tion of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, IO COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. I, 17-25 (1985) 
(analyzing and criticizing a proposal for limiting judicial review of negotiated regulations). 
5. 5 u.s.c. §§ 561-570 (2006). 
6 . Id. § 510 ("Nothing in this section shall bar judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is 
otherwise provided by law. A rule which is the product of negotiated rulemaking and is subject to 
judicial review shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the product 
of other rulemaking procedures."). 
7. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (set-
ting aside negotiated rule as inconsistent with the statute, but without mentioning the rule's back-
ground); Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 990 F.2d 1531 (9thCir. 
1993) (deferring to statutory interpretation embodied in a negotiated rule without attaching any signi-
ficance to its background); Steel Joist Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 287 F.3d 1165, 
1166 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding a rule and noting, but making little of, the fact that it was "based on 
a consensus document submitted by a rulemaking advisory committee in a negotiated rulemaking"); 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding 
EPA regulations without mentioning their negotiated background); Safe Buildings Alliance v. U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 846 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA regulations without mentioning 
their negotiated background); Lifestar Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
604 F. Supp.2d 1372 (M .D. Ga. 2009). 
8. See, e.g., United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev't, 
567 F.3d 1235, 1246 (I 0th Cir. 2009) (setting aside a regulation under Chevron step one and noting 
that "the fact that the regulatory scheme was developed through a negotiated rulemaking procedure is 
of no relevance to this determination"); Fort Peck Hous. Auth. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev't, 435 
F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134 (D. Colo. 2006); cf USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (expressing some skepticism about negotiated rulemaking and emphasizing that ordinary 
principles of judicial review apply to challenges to negotiated rules). 
9. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REY. 
1189 (1986) (for a broad overview). 
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tory that the New Deal reformers generally, and James Landis in particular, 10 
rested their hopes for administrative government on three basic principles: the 
affirmation of expertise, agency insulation from central political control, and 
agency insulation from political oversight. 11 The three very much went together; 
because the problems faced by agencies are technical ones to which there are right 
and wrong answers, administrators must be expert, and they should be left alone 
to do their work. That understanding underlies creation of independent agencies, 
which were to be independent of political interference. But in the early twentieth 
century, the idea also existed that agencies should be similarl1 free of judicial review, for they substituted for and displaced judicial authority. 1 For example, in 
1917, Adolph Berle wrote in the Harvard Law Review: "Of necessity, a special 
administrative [body] must exclude the general body-the court, the legislature, 
the governor and subordinate machinery-in so far as its field extends. Any other 
rule would mean chaos."13 
The period after the New Deal, Reuel Schiller reports, was one of particular 
judicial passivity and deference to administrative agencies.14 As the Supreme 
Court and the rest of the federal judiciary became dominated by Roosevelt appoin-
tees, many of whom had held other governmental posts, and the constitutional 
battles of the New Deal ebbed, the Landisian confidence in agency isolation and 
expertise triumphed in the courts. 15 
Starting in the second half of the twentieth century, however, the general 
trend has been away from the idea that there is a science of administration. 16 
Agencies are more often perceived instead as addressing questions that do not 
have right answers; as a result, what legitimates agency decisions is a democratic 
pedigree. On this view, expertise is less relevant and political influence less prob-
lematic. Indeed, political influence becomes necessary to give agency decisions 
legitimacy, for nothing else can do so. Accordingly, we see fewer independent 
agencies and a steady increase in presidential control of the bureaucracy. 17 
I 0 . See generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS ( 1938). 
11. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAUDIRTY AIR 4-7 (1981); 
John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the 
Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071 , 1080-94 (2000). 
12. See CARL MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FTC AND THE ICC, 1920-1930, at 92 
( 1933). McFarland complained: 
[T]he history of judicial review of regulatory orders of the Federal Trade Commission clearly 
discloses that the judges substitute their own opinions for those of the commissioners or, even 
when sustaining the commission, hold themselves in readiness to reverse or modify orders with 
which they do not agree. The hopes of those who studied the situation during the first years have 
not been fulfilled. 
Id. 
13. Adolph A. Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 430, 446-
47 (1917). 
14. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007). 
15. Id. at 430-40. 
16. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons learned Since 
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281-82 (1986). 
17. Gary Edles & Marshall J. Breger, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Inde-
pendent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1210 (2000) (summarizing the falling out of favor 
of independent agencies); Duffy, supra note 11, at 1118-19; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
I 14 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275-81 (2001) (reviewing history of increasing presidential control). 
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To some extent, debate over the proper role of judicial review lies outside this 
dispute. Courts suffer from both a democracy deficit and an expertise deficit; 
whichever your model of agency action, courts have little to add. Indeed, this is 
why Chevron 18 offers two basic justifications for strong deferencir-agencies have 
an edge in expertise, and they have an edge in democratic legitimacy-without 
choosing between them. 19 Thus, no theory of judicial review, unlike presidential 
or congressional oversight, endorses the substitution of the court's judgment for 
the agency's. The justifications for judicial review involve ensuring that the 
agency is doing its job properly, according to requisite procedures, and within 
legal boundaries. This understanding of judicial review still resonates with the 
expertise and preference models. On the one hand, judicial review enforces popu-
lar preferences by ensuring that the agency is acting consistently with congres-
sional constraints, which are deemed to reflect popular preferences. And on the 
other, by insisting on reasoned decision-making and adequate explanations, judi-
cial review ensures that the agency decision really does reflect expertise. 
The case for collaborative governance makes claims under both the expertise 
and preference aggregation models, but the latter is far more important. To be 
sure, part of the idea is to tap into the expertise of the people with the most know-
ledge and the most precise understanding of the burdens and benefits of (and poss-
ible alternatives to) a given regulatory proposat.20 But information-gathering of 
that sort is possible without everyone sitting down around a table,21 and agencies 
do it in many effective, non-collaborative ways. Indeed, some critics of reg-neg 
suggest that participants will withhold information strategically, 22 and even boost-
ers perceive information asymmetries among the participants as a defect in the 
process.23 In addition, the expertise claim for reg-neg is limited to its value in 
producing useful information. But "expertise" is not the same as knowledge. The 
agency's expertise, by hypothesis, lies in its understanding of the overall statutory 
and regulatory regime, the choices between regulatory tools, the brass tacks of 
18. Chevron U.S.A. , Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
19. Id. at 865-66 (noting that because "[j]udges are not experts in the field," "are not part of either 
political branch of government," and "have no constituency," they should defer to agency policy-
making). 
20. See, e.g., Lee M. Thomas, The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation by EPA, 13 Admin. L. 
News No. I, at 2, 3 (Fall 1987) (noting that EPA pursued regulatory negotiation in part because of a 
desire to "bring to the table as much technical information as possible"). 
21. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, AN ASSESSMENT 
OF EPA's NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACTIVITIES 12 (1987) ("While negotiators may bring some 
relevant data to the table, negotiated rulemaking is certainly not the only way, nor is it necessarily the 
best way, to obtain data, especially detailed scientific and technical data on the nature and extent of 
health and environmental risk and on the technological and economic feasibility of alternative solu-
tions."), reprinted in NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 23, 34 {David M. Pritzker & Deborah 
S. Dalton eds., 1995). 
22. See, e.g., Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference 
Apply?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2000) (noting that regulated entities may withhold informa-
tion during the negotiation); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at 
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1209 (1994) ("Negotiation is not effective when technical 
information is needed to resolve factual disputes."); Stephanie Stem, Cognitive Consistency: Theory 
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 641 (2002) (summarizing and 
citing to the literature). 
23. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Bene.fit, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 123 (2000). 
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actual rule-writing, the challenges of enforcement, the role of the market, and 
other aspects of public administration that private entities lack. Negotiated rule-
making adds nothing in this respect and, to the extent the agency defers to the 
group, might produce results that the "expert" would deem suboptimal. 
Accordingly, the stronger claim for collaborative governance sounds not in 
expertise but in democracy. I use the term advisedly, for one standard objection to 
reg-neg is that it is undemocratic. 24 That objection rests on an understanding of 
agencies as accountable actors; because reg-neg involves the shift of decision-
making authority from accountable public entities to unaccountable private par-
ties, it is a shift away from democratic decision-making. However, if the colla-
borative process is truly inclusive, leading to a consensus among representatives 
of all stakeholders, then it can claim a democratic legitimacy that ordinary agency 
decision-making lacks (and some agency decision-making, reflecting the asymme-
tries in access and information of different interests, lacks profoundly). What 
makes the outcome worthy of respect, then, is that it reflects consensus among all 
stakeholders. It is this consensus that bestows reg-neg its "legitimacy benefit" 
among the participants and its claim to the respect of nonparticipants.25 The col-
lective judgment is not so much correct, though it may be that, as it is agreed 
upon.26 
Now, we have a model for judicial review of such decisions: it is that other 
"judicial review"-judicial review of legislation. Legislation, too, may be right, 
but mainly it just is. What legitimates it is not the legislators' expertise, but their 
democratic mandate and constitutional lawmaking authority. And judicial review 
of legislation is extremely limited. Courts merely ask if the law is constitutional 
and, in general, that means rationality review of the most toothless sort, far less 
ferocious than really any version of arbitrary and capricious review of administra-
tive agencies.27 So here's the strong proposition: because collaborative gover-
24. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a 
Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1994) (dismissing regulatory negotiation as "inadequate" if 
one accepts a basic commitment to the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process). 
25 . See generally Freeman & Langbein, supra note 23. 
26. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. I, 17 (1982) 
("Agency actions no longer gain acceptance from the presumed expertise of its staff. It is no longer 
viewed as legitimate simply because it fill s in the gaps left by Congress, or because it is guided by 
widely accepted public philosophy. To the extent that rulemaking has political legitimacy, it derives 
from the right of affected interests to present facts and arguments . ... "); see also Danielle Holley-
Walker, The Importance of Negotiated Rulemaking to the No Child Left Behind Act, 85 NEB. L. REV. 
1015, 1039 (2007) ("Traditional APA rulemaking attempts to garner legitimacy by relying on agency 
expertise, whereas negotiated rulemaking derives its legitimacy from interested parties and the agency 
reaching a consensus .... "). Or, in the words of two reg-neg skeptics rather than yet another booster: 
"Under the EPA's concept of reg neg, the agency is reduced to little more than a regulatory real-estate 
agent, whose true client is neither the buyer nor the seller, but the deal that can be struck between 
them." Rena Steinzor & Scott Strauss, Building a Consensus: Agencies Stressing "Reg Neg " Ap-
proach, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 16, 17. 
Under the NRA, the agency must still go through a notice-and-comment process, and retains the 
authority to abandon the consensus proposal in the final regulation. For many reasons, it will be reluc-
tant to do so. See infra text and notes at nn. 86-87. Nonetheless, that possibility means that existing 
reg-neg is shy of the platonic ideal of negotiated rulemaking; to the extent it is just standard agency 
rulemaking, the argument for a different approach to judicial review evaporates. 
27. It is black-letter law that the arbitrary and capricious test is more demanding than rationality 
review under the due process clause. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass' n v. Stale Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43, 44 n.9 (1983). 
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nance does not so much implement legislative decision-making as it replaces it, 
courts should review it like they review legislation. Since it is not legislation, a 
court must make a threshold determination that what it is reviewing is a bona fide 
instance of collaborative governance that resulted from a truly representative and 
procedurally adequate process. But as long as that threshold determination was 
made, courts should accept the outcome of the process. 
Hints of such restrained judicial review are present in recent proposals for ne-
gotiated policy-making that would be Jess agency-centered and more "democrat-
ic." For example, David Fontana argues for the creation of what he calls "democ-
racy index rulemaking."28 This would come in two versions. One is a small 
change to existing notice-and-comment procedures. At the close of the comment 
period, the agency would have to prepare a "democratic participation statement" 
indicating the number and source of relevant and non-repetitive comments. Fon-
tana proposes that the greater the level of public participatioo--the higher the 
rule's "democracy index"--the more deferential should be the judicial review.29 
His bolder proposal is for "deliberative notice and comment." This procedure 
would involve inviting stakeholders and lay citizens to participate in "randomly 
organized juries" that would produce an evaluative report to the agency about a 
proposed rule.30 The report would not bind the agency; Fontana still imagines that 
the agency would have the authority to reject the results of these discussions, 
though it would have to take them seriously. 31 But the resulting rule would be 
subject to highly deferential judicial review. 32 
Or consider Keren Azulay's proposal for "Constructive Controversy Delibe-
rations."33 This idea is less tied to agency decision-making; it is a mechanism for 
resolving public issues that have generated controversy and, it would seem, led to 
a lawsuit. The idea is to get contentious issues out of the courts, rather than get-
ting them out of agencies.34 Azulay's article is focused on the mechanisms for 
selecting participants for a deliberative process; she is largely silent about the 
judicial role in overseeing or reviewing the results of the process that follows 
initial selection. But it is clear that she, too, imagines substantive review of the 
lightest sort--merely ensuring that the outcome "falls within a zone of reasona-
bleness."35 
Finally, the boldest proposals for policy-making through ')uries," deliberative 
polling, and the like come from non-lawyers, who are not steeped in administra-
28. David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005). 
29. Id. at 90. Without assessing Fontana's proposal in full, I would note that his confidence in 
judges' ability to precisely calibrate their level of scrutiny according to the rule's democracy index 
rests on some heroic assumptions; if judges are really that capable, the country would be best off if 
judicial review was not deferential in the least. 
30. Id. at 91 -96. 
31. Id. at 95. 
32. Id. at 98-99. 
33. Keren Azulay, Knights of the Round Table: Participant Selection Mechanism/or Court-Related 
Deliberations, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733 (2007). 
34. "CCD seeks to circumvent these criticisms by devising a decisionmaking procedure that chal-
lenges the traditional role of courts. Under CCD, courts, instead of ruling on issues where there is deep 
moral disagreement, instigate and supervise the formation of a deliberative procedure and review its 
outcome." Id. at 739. 
35. Id. at 738 . 
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tive law traditions. For them, judicial review disappears from the picture alto-
gether, precisely because the model is one of direct democratic policy-making, 
rather than agency implementation.36 Presumably the outcomes of these processes 
would be reviewed for constitutionality and nothing else, like legislation. 
For the true believer, then, there is not much that courts can bring to the table. 
In contrast, for the skeptic, judicial review of collaborative governance should be 
especially strenuous. Precisely because of its similarity to the legislative process, 
collaborative governance is especially likely to suffer from exactly the defects 
judicial review exists to catch. If the process is nothing but a massive delegation 
of government authority to the private sector, then judicial policing of the out-
comes is vital. The strenuousness of review should be tied to the risk of illegality, 
which is especially high here, for the chances of the agency exceeding or ignoring 
statutory limits or tolerating an incoherent or suboptimal result are greatest when 
there is the momentum of stakeholder consensus supporting a particular out-
come. 37 
Thus, one's willingness to take this strong position depends not so much on 
one's belief or confidence in courts as it does on one's belief or confidence in 
collaborative governance. On this, I confess agnosticism. But in the pages that 
follow, I will explore the implications for judicial review of the strongly held op-
posing positions of collaborative governance generally and negotiated rulemaking 
in particular. 
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW DOCTRINES 
The basic goals or justifications of judicial review are to ensure (a) the legali-
ty; (b) the rationality; and (c) the procedural regularity of agency action. The 
question is whether the need for judicial oversight on any of those three scores is 
altered when the action in question is one form or another of collaborative gover-
nance rather than unilateral agency action. And one's answer to that is likely to 
depend on whether one is a true believer or a skeptic when it comes to collabora-
tive governance. 
A. Substantive Rationality and Reasoned Decision-Making 
The strong position is that courts should review agency action for rationality 
but only in the limited sense that a deeply irrational governmental action is un-
36. See, e.g .• JAMES s. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009). Fishkin is arguably the leading proponent of deliberative polling as a 
policy-making tool. 
37. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and 
the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997) (objecting that "the principles, 
theory, and practice of negotiated rulemaking subtly subvert the basic, underlying concepts of Ameri-
can administrative law"); id. at 1387 (arguing that the incentives for rulemak.ing by consensus "subvert 
the principles underlying traditional administrative Jaw by elevating the importance of consensus 
among the parties above the law, the facts, or the public interest") ; William Funk, When Smoke Gets in 
Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public lnterest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. 
L. 55 ( I 987) (arguing that a particular reg-neg produced an illegal rule). 
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constitutional. As discussed above, the analogy is to the legislative process.38 
The legislative process is deliberative and political, reaching outcomes through 
compromise and logrolling. The outcome may well be incoherent. Explanations 
may be dubious, self-serving, or absent altogether. But for better or worse, deci-
sion-making authority has been placed with the legislature, subject to electoral 
constraints, and therefore we live with some goofiness and don't expect elegant 
internal consistency. As with juries,39 the authority of the decision-maker leads 
courts to treat the process as a black box. 
The strongest version of such an approach is "pure procedural justice." In 
such a regime, the idea of the "correct outcome" is incoherent, for there is no in-
dependent or external metric against which to evaluate the outcome. The correct 
outcome, by definition, is the one that results from the designated process. 40 The 
standard example is gambling. There is no right result from throwing dice or 
spinning the roulette wheel; the outcome is the outcome, and as long as the dice 
were not loaded and there were no magnets in the roulette wheel , there is nothing 
to say about the result except that it is the result.41 The idea of a substantive ob-
jection is incoherent. 
To the reg-neg true believer, these analogies to legislatures, juries, and gam-
bling should be powerful. Confidence in the process--which mimics the legisla-
tive process, has some of the elements of popular decision-making valued in ju-
ries, and leads to outcomes that are "right" because they result from the 
process--argues for highly deferential judicial review of outcomes. Moreover, to 
the extent arbitrary and capricious review is supposed to ensure that the agency 
considers alternatives and carefully thinks things through, it is redundant. Careful 
consideration is built in to the process. The agency cannot avoid considering (re-
levant) alternatives because the process compels thoroughness in that regard. 
Finally, to the extent that courts directly consider the substantive "reasonableness" 
of the rule, the fact that it has the consensus support of all stakeholders is a pretty 
powerful (perhaps dispositive?) indicator of reasonableness.42 But most impor-
38. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge 
Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 68 ( 1986) ("[N]egotiated rulemaking is like legislation-a method 
for reaching a political accommodation."). 
39. The law's hands-off treatment of jury verdicts is another setting in which inconsistencies and 
explanatory gaps are accepted as a matter of course. Consider, in particular, the problem of inconsis-
tent jury verdicts. Powerful arguments have been made that at least in some circumstances inconsistent 
verdicts should not be allowed to stand. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our 
Foolish law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771 (1998). Yet the Supreme Court is un-
fazed . "While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required." Standefer v. 
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980). Logically, they should be a real problem, but in this setting we 
put up with a level of irrationality that would be both inconceivable and intolerable from an agency. 
40. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-89 (1971). Rawls distinguishes pure, perfect, and 
imperfect procedural justice. Imperfect procedural justice is exemplified by the criminal trial ; we can 
define the correct outcome by an independent criterion but lack procedures that ensure it is reached. 
See id. at 85-86. Perfect procedural justice always accomplishes the desired outcome. See id. at 85. In a 
system of pure procedural justice, we do not know, or have abandoned the effort to define, the correct 
outcome; instead, whatever outcome the process produces is by definition fair. 
41. Id. at 86. 
42. See Wald, ADR and the Courts, supra note 4, at 1468 (stating that "the court should be able to 
take account of consensus a5 a factor suggesting the reasonableness of the rule"). 
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tant, an inquiry into substantive reasonableness or the quality of the analysis is out 
of place for the reasons discussed above. 43 
Needless to say, this hands-off approach seems completely at odds with ac-
cepted understandings of arbitrary and capricious review, requirements of "rea-
soned decision-makinz/' and the Supreme Court's endorsement of "hard look" 
review in State Farm. The exact status of State Farm can be debated, but there 
is no question that judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard has 
some teeth. If a regulation has nothing to recommend it other than stakeholder 
consensus, that is the very model of arbitrary and capricious action under State 
Farm.45 Nonetheless, one might conceivably square "soft glance"46 review ofreg-
neg with State Farm by returning to the distinction between expertise and politics 
with which I began. 
Part of the disagreement between the five-justice majority and the four dis-
senters in State Farm was over the role of politics in agency decision-making. 
The challenged action was the repeal by the new (Republican) administration of a 
regulation that had been issued by its (Democratic) predecessor. Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent emphasized that the change was predictable, understandable, and 
reasonable--and, therefore, legally valid--in light of the fact that Ronald Reagan 
had won the previous presidential election. The policy shift was legitimated by 
the democratic consensus reflected in Reagan's victory, which followed a cam-
paign in which deregulatory promises figured prominently. For Rehnquist, the 
agency did not have to explain anything; it got to do what it wanted because it had 
been elected to do what it wanted (which was roughly congruent with what a ma-
jority of the electorate wanted). Writing for the majority, Justice White ignored 
this line of argument entirely. He insisted that the agency produce a coherent 
explanation and that the explanation go beyond the simple truism that "we're in 
charge now."47 Accordingly, State Farm separated politics and policy; the former 
could not justify the latter; agencies had to justify their decisions on the basis of 
facts, technical considerations, logic, or statutorily relevant factors. 48 
The Rehnquist position has gained traction in some circles in the decades 
since State Farm was decided. For example, in a recent article, Kathryn Watts 
argues that political considerations should always be relevant to arbitrary and 
43. See also Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 Pue. ADMIN. REV. 
764, 770 (1988) ("[Regulatory negotiation] subordinates the fact and value premises of decision to the 
instrumental needs of the parties as they seek consensus .... [N]egotiation stands in contrast with the 
net-benefit and other analytically-based policy models."). 
44. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
45. In a well-known early article, Henry Perritt put it more mildly: "a rule promulgated solely be-
cause it is agreed upon in negotiations among affected parties might be vulnerable to attack as being 
arbitrary and capricious." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The 
Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 Pepp L. Rev. 865, 910 (1987). 
46. The phrase was coined by William Rogers in describing the Supreme Court's deferential ap-
proach to agency actions under the National Environmental Policy Act. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A 
Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Low Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J . 699 (1979). 
47. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57; see also Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administra-
tive Law, 99 Nw. L. REV. 297, 310-11 (2004) ("Justice White did not contradict Justice Rehnquist's 
description of the political setting or conclude that it was outweighed by other factors. Rather, he 
ignored it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics of the rescission simply irrelevant."). 
48. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226 (1990) {"the 
submerged yet powerful message in the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm [was] that the politi-
cal directions of a particular administration are inadequate to justify regulatory policy"). 
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capricious review.49 But those circles do not include the courts, which have stood 
by the technocratic approach to arbitrary and capricious review established in 
State Farm.50 Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent greenhouse gas decision, Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA,51 can be seen as State Farm triumphant, "part of a trend in 
which the Court has at least temporarily become disenchanted with executive 
power and the idea of political accountability and is now concerned to protect 
administrative expertise from political intrusion."52 Nonetheless, if there is any 
setting in which the Rehnquist position works well, it is with regard to collabora-
tive governance. The election of a president, and presidential control over agen-
cies, can be dismissed as too dilute, indirect, and uncertain to justify forgoing a 
reasoned explanation for agency action. But hands-on participation of the affected 
parties in formulation of a government policy is a much more direct and pure form 
of popular decision-making. Therefore, the argument would go, there is no need 
for judicial oversight of the rationality of what the agency has done, and, there-
fore, no need for a good explanation to ensure and enable meaningful judicial 
review of such rationality. 
Of course, at the extreme, the perversity of a given outcome makes it uncons-
titutional. The black-letter rule under State Farm is that the arbitrary and capri-
cious test is more exacting than is the rationality requirement under the due 
process clause. But in the collaborative governance setting, the foregoing sug-
gests that would not be the case; rather, the only substantive review would be for 
constitutionality and nothing more. 
B. Legality 
The second basic ground for judicial review is legality. We look to the courts 
to police the boundaries of agency authority, particularly those established by 
statute.53 Indeed, this is the most basic and obvious justification for judicial re-
view. Agencies are creatures of statute; they have only those authorities granted 
by Congress; they are subject to statutory limitations; under the rule of law, courts 
are necessary to police those legal boundaries.54 Accordingly, courts must set 
49. Kathryn Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review, 119 YALE 
L.J. 2 (2009). 
50. See id. at 14-23. 
51. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
52. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 51 , 54. 
53. 1 set to one side review for constitutionality. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(8) (2006). There is no se-
rious argument for immunizing collaborative governance from judicial review for constitutionality. 
More precisely, there is no reason to preclude such review in this setting in particular. I only address 
judicial review for nonconstitutional defects. 
54. See, e.g. , Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442-43 (1989) (describing judicial review, which requires agencies to demon-
strate their authority for action, as "at the heart of a commitment to the rule of law"); Richard Pierce, 
The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 NYU L. REV. 1239 
(1989). 
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aside agency action that is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right. "55 
Here again, one could argue that this model is inapplicable to reg-neg, which 
is itself a form of lawmaking. To take full advantage of the benefits of reg-neg, 
outcomes should not be bounded by statutory limits; we should not entrench statu-
tory decisions for agencies any more than we should for legislatures. Thus, Bill 
Funk may be entirely correct in arguing that EPA's negotiated wood stove rule 
was illegal under the Clean Air Act,56 but we should not care. Because this is a 
democratic, quasi-legislative process, nothing is to be gained by having courts 
determine whether it is consistent with a statutory mandate. Either it is consistent, 
in which case there is no value in checking. Or it is not, in which case it is, by 
hypothesis, an improvement.57 
This idea, and the discomfort it generates, are captured compactly in the 
much-quoted adage within EPA about another collaborative effort, Project XL: 
"If it isn't illegal, it isn't XL."58 But let me offer a different example from the 
early days of modem environmental law, which was a sort of reg-neg before such 
a concept existed. 
The original version of the modem Clean Water Act, enacted in 1972, re-
quired EPA to establish effluent standards for the discharge of toxic water pollu-
tants. The standards were to be based solely on considerations of human health 
and environmental quality; considerations of cost and available technology were 
off limits. After four years, EPA had managed to produce a grand total of zero 
such standards. The Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental 
groups sued, multiple times.59 There was no question EPA had missed the statuto-
ry deadlines; the only question was what relief would be appropriate. The parties 
entered into an agreement under which EPA would issue standards under a com-
pletely different regulatory approach, one based on the best available technology. 
Judge Thomas Flannery gave his blessing to this arrangement in an eponymous 
consent decree.60 The consent decree was inescapably and flatly inconsistent with 
the Clean Water Act. Had EPA written regulations, on its own initiative, in the 
55 . 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006); see also id. § 558(b) ("A sanction may not be imposed or a subs-
tantive rule or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by 
law."). 
56. See Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes, supra note 37. 
57. One other thing to consider is how the availability of judicial review for compliance with the 
statute affects the dynamics of the negotiation. At present, one of the things that someone at the table 
can say is: that's illegal. Eliminating judicial review would eliminate that argument. Perhaps that 
would systematically reduce the clout of certain interests, or eliminate a useful constraint. Alternative-
ly, however, it might enhance the process; it would be liberating, freeing the participants to do what is 
sensible, unconstrained by the artificial or poorly thought-through constraints from the legislature. 
58. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Com-
mand to Self-Control , 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 147 (1998) (quoting an unknown Environmental 
Protection Agency staff member). Alternatively, and more pungently, "if it ain ' t illegal, it ain ' t XL." 
MALCOLM SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFr: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND 
MANAGING COMPLIANCE 23 (2000). 
59. The procedural history of the litigation is set out in Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 
F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
60. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), rev 'd in part 
on other grounds sub nom. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The 
story of the litigation and its aftermath is recounted in Rosemary O ' Leary, The Courts and the EPA : 
The Amazing "Flannery Decision ", 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 18 (1990). 
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manner approved by the decree, any court in the country would have set aside the 
regulations as inconsistent with the statute. Nonetheless, Judge Flannery accepted 
the agreement of EPA and the environmental group plaintiffs, ignored the objec-
tions of industry intervenors, and approved this entirely different approach to 
standard-setting.61 Now, the Flannery Decree cannot be said to be a reassuring 
example of something that was a reg-neg in everything but name because the 
stakeholders did not, in fact, reach a consensus; industry groups were strongly 
opposed.62 But it stands as an example--in retrospect, most would say a highly 
successful example by objective measures-of judicial approval of an agreed-
upon approach to a problem that was simply unavailable under the statute. 
One further justification comes into play here, and it is relevant to the other 
sections of the discussion as well. A familiar justification for judicial review is 
that agencies are more subject to interest group capture than are courts.63 If that is 
in fact the case--not everyone thinks it is64--the concern about capture should be 
far more dilute in the collaborative governance setting. If the process of collabo-
ration has been full, fair, and open to all affected interests, and the outcome ac-
ceptable to all , then capture by a particular group or groups has been, by defini-
tion, avoided. Of course, once again, this conclusion depends on whether one can 
swallow this rosy depiction of reg-neg. Skeptics view the negotiation not so much 
as a means of avoiding capture as the opposite. Judge Posner has written that for 
an agency to be bound by a private consensus "sounds like an abdication of regu-
latory authority to the regulated, the full burgeoning of the interest-group state, 
and the final confirmation of the 'capture' theory of administrative regulation."65 
Now, this strong version of judicial non-review is not reflected in the NRA. 
The NRA only produces a proposed rule, not a final rule; after that, the AP A takes 
over, intact. Under the NRA, (a) the agency makes the final decision (b) subject 
to statutory constraints, and (c) the court reviews compliance with the APA and 
background statutes. Yet, if one really has confidence in the process, and really 
all interests are represented, why not just let the participants decide, without the 
ignorant, paternalistic, inefficient intrusion of the courts? One might compare this 
to how true believers in markets feel about regulation. For example, free marke-
ters contend that, absent externalities, people should be able to negotiate for their 
preferred balance of safety and wealth. Workers and employers should be able to 
opt for higher wages and riskier workplaces; manufacturers and purchasers should 
be able to agree on a trade-off of price and risk in consumer products--no Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration and no Consumer Products Safety 
Commission. To its staunchest advocates, reg-neg has many of the same, see-
mingly magical, qualities that the market possesses in the eyes of its staunchest 
advocates and should be left alone to work that magic. 
61. Congress subsequently amended the statute to incorporate the essentials of the Flannery Decree. 
Clean Water Act of 1977 § 53, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53, 91 Stat. 1566, 1589-90 (1977), codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ l317(a)(l)-(2) (2006). 
62. O' Leary, supra note 60, at 20. 
63. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 501-502 (1997); Sunstein, 
supra note 16, at 289. 
64. For a highly skeptical discussion, see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial 
Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314-26 (1999). 
65. USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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There is one large barrier to abandoning all judicial review for legality. It is 
the Constitution. Congress makes the laws. It can delegate, massively, but other 
actors, including agencies and reg-neg committees, can only act legislatively to 
the extent they have congressionally delegated authority to do so.66 Part of what 
makes this delegation permissible is judicial review, at least according to many 
judges.67 Accordingly, it would be a challenge to convince courts to permit or 
adopt a regime of no judicial review for consistency with the statute. 
The milder position, then, would be that judicial review to determine consis-
tency with the statute should take place but in a highly deferential form. Phil Har-
ter has advocated such an approach. For example, defending the EPA's wood 
stove rule, he writes, "while the rule may not fit comfortably within a narrow 
reading of the Clean Air Act, it is within its overall theory, and a decision that is 
reached by a democratic process should be accorded some leeway in that re-
gard."68 To paraphrase a familiar Scalia-ism, it is "good enough for non-
government work." I am not sure that this approach is entirely coherent; it stakes 
out something of the same awkward ground as the concept of being only a little 
bit pregnant. However, there is at least one place in the law where something 
similar takes place, namely judicial approval of settlements.69 Collaborative go-
vernance is a kind of settlement and ought perhaps to be reviewed in the same 
way. That would mean, at a minimum, that courts could approve an agency action 
that the statute does not itself require (and, thus, that courts could not themselves 
mandate).70 However, it could also mean courts could approve negotiated agree-
ments that go beyond what the statute allows. 
C. Procedures 
The legislative analogy would argue against judicial review of procedural 
adequacy as well. After all, courts have always been highly reluctant to police 
legislative procedures. The due process clause has been held not to apply to legis-
latures; 71 the enrolled bill doctrine precludes judicial investigation into compliance 
66. See, e.g., Toni M. Fine, Appellate Practice on Review of Agency Action: A Guide for Practition-
ers, 28 U. T0L. L. REV. I, 2 (1997) ("agencies are creatures of statute, whose existence and powers 
exist only by virtue of Congress. In this connection, they are subject to limits on their delegated power 
as established by their enabling statutes .... "). 
67. Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d I, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Leventhal, 
J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and the courts 
have upheld such delegations-because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the 
delegated power within statutory limits."). 
68. Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Replies to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor Menke/-
Meadow's Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379, 384 n.34 (2004-2005). See also Harter, 
supra note 38, at 63-64 (suggesting that "a bit of play is needed in the joint~ of the statute" and calling 
on reviewing courts "to define the authority of the agency but provide a little leeway to accommodate 
practical interpretations and implementation"). 
69. On the standards for such approvals generally, see In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 
957 F.2d 1020, 2025-26 (2d Cir. 1992). 
70. Local No. 93, lnt'I Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] 
federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree pro-
vides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial."). 
71 . See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
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with specific constitutional requirements for legislation;72 courts almost never 
review or enforce Congress's own rules;73 and the periodic academic calls for 
judicial scrutiny of "due process of lawmaking"74 have gone unheeded. The Su-
preme Court has taken a small step in this direction by purporting to treat legisla-
tion supported by congressional findings with greater respect than legislation 
adopted without such findings,75 but (a) that incentive is a far cry from direct judi-
cial review of congressional procedures and (b) the Court has received a chorus of 
academic criticism for doing so.76 Indeed, the critics often state their objection as 
being that the Court is treating Congress "like an administrative agency."77 As 
discussed above, the true believer would argue the opposite side; that in the reg-
neg setting, courts should treat agencies "like Congress." If that is correct on the 
substantive side, shouldn't it also be correct on the procedural side? 
Such an argument is, in fact, wholly misplaced. For it is only because certain 
procedures have been followed that the agency outcome would merit the defe-
rence afforded the legislature. It is pure bootstrapping to extend that deference to 
procedural requirements. Because it has followed certain procedures, the agency 
is reviewed as if it were Congress; because the agency is reviewed as if it were 
Congress, the court should not scrutinize its procedures! What tidy circularity. 
To the contrary, judicial review would seem to be quite important, precisely be-
cause a prerequisite for the legitimacy of the collaborative process and the premise 
of the undertaking is that certain procedures will be followed. In addition, it is a 
familiar idea in judicial review of agency action that, to some extent, procedural 
and substantive review are alternatives. The case for mild or nonexistent substan-
tive review is stronger where strict procedural review occurs, and vice versa.78 
Thus, the analogy is not to the non-justiciability of claims regarding legislative 
72. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 668-73 (1892) (holding that signature by President and both Hous-
es of Congress renders statute constitutional, notwithstanding allegation that enrolled bill omits por-
tions of legislation actually passed by both houses). For a rare, and quite inconsequential, instance of 
the Court actually reviewing whether constitutional procedures for legislation had been complied with, 
see United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (considering whether a law was invalid be-
cause it was a revenue-raising measure that had not originated in the House). 
73. See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (refusing to review 
House allocation of committee seats on separation-of-powers grounds, while also confirming power to 
review rules for "constitutional infirmity"); see generally Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting 
Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1275 ("When courts do not sum-
marily dismiss procedural claims, they accord extraordinary deference to the legislature."). 
74. For the first and still most important example, see Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 
55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) . 
76. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 87, 119-35 (2001). 
77. The phrase began with, or at least is strongly associated with, Justice Breyer, who objected in a 
dissent that the Court was "reviewing the congressional record as if it was an administrative record." 
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
78. Although "hard look review" came to mean a searching judicial review of the agency's reason-
ing and substantive position, it originated in the idea of ensuring that the agency had taken a hard look 
at the problem, as evidenced by the fullness and openness of its procedures and the thoroughness of its 
reasoning. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(stating that the reviewing court must ensure that "the agency has ... really taken a 'hard look ' at the 
salient problems, and has ... genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making"). 
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procedures, but to the justiciability, and the important role of the courts in adjudi-
cating, (most) claims regarding elections.79 
The most important procedural requirement in reg-neg is that all affected in-
terests have a seat at the table.so The process itself is designed to maximize the 
chances that they will, and the agency has important incentives to be inclusive in 
putting together a committee. Nonetheless, one would have to have extraordinary 
confidence in those incentives and in agency good faith to conclude that procedur-
al review was unnecessary.s 1 An excluded entity has to be able to go to court to 
argue that it should have been present. 
It is equally important that the rule actually reflect a consensus. The legiti-
macy of the outcome lies in the fact that it reflects consensus; what makes it ra-
tional is that the participants agreed to it. While outright fraud is unlikely, judicial 
review would catch, and, more importantly, deter, instances where consensus was 
inadequate and objections were overridden. 
Of course, the NRA does not require the exacting procedural review I have 
just argued for. To the contrary, "any agency action relating to establishing, as-
s1stmg, or terminating a negotiated rulemaking shall not be subject to judicial 
review."s2 Though almost never litigated, presumably because potential litigants 
79. At a high level of abstraction, the claim here echoes representation-reinforcing theories of (con-
stitutional) judicial review. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW ( 1980). 
80. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 564(a)(8), (b) (2006); Azulay, supra note 33, at 759-65; Tom R. Tyler, 
Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Gov-
ernment, 28 LAW & Soc' y REV. 809, 829 (1994); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 981, 996-97 (1993). 
81 . Writing a generation ago, Dick Stewart contemplated the possibility of new structures to actual-
ize an interest-group representation model of administrative decision-making, one of which was for 
private interest groups designated by Congress to select administrative officials who would serve fixed 
terms. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1794-97 (1975). "Policy would result from a process of bargaining among the representatives of af-
fected interests. Unlike a judicially developed system of interest representation, where policy is made 
by non-elected agency officials or judges, the representative process would determine, and presumably 
legitimate, policy." Id. at 1790. In such a regime: 
the developing judicial role in controlling agency discretion by expanding participation rights at 
the agency level and insisting upon adequate consideration of all affected interests would, in 
theory, be severely circumscribed. Since agency policy would result from a bargaining process in 
which all affected interests (as determined by the legislature) are directly or indirectly 
represented, there should be no occasion for judicial inquiry into the nature of the interests that 
participate in the decision-making process or into the consideration (adequate or otherwise) ac-
corded to each of the competing interests, so long as the council remained within the usually 
broad confines of applicable statutes. 
Id. at 1799. 
This vision of a constrained judicial role is in fact wholly consistent with the discussion herein. On 
the one hand, substantive policy review drops out for the reasons discussed above. In Stewart's im-
agined regime, procedural review is also dilute, but that is because Congress has designated specific 
participants, which eliminates the central role for the courts. In reg-neg as it exists, the agency assem-
bles a committee subject to Congress's requirements of balance, comprehensiveness, and so on; that 
instantiates the interest-representation model, but gives the courts a central role in ensuring compliance 
with Congress' s requirements. And apart from this role of enforcing statutory commands, what Stewart 
describes as "the developing judicial role in controlling agency discretion by expanding participation 
rights at the agency level and insisting upon adequate consideration of all affected interests" remains 
appropriate-if anything more so-in the reg-neg setting. 
82. 5 U.S.C. § 570 (2006). 
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can read, this provision has been taken to mean what it says, and no challenges to 
the composition of a committee or other NRA procedures have gone forward.83 
How can this provision be justified? Three justifications are plausible; all 
stem from the fact that the NRA is a quite partial step toward true collaborative 
governance. First, the bar on review reflects a reasonable desire to avoid having 
the reg-neg process derailed by "interlocutory" judicial challenges.84 This limita-
tion is not inappropriate, but goes to timing rather than availability of review. 
Second, the practical impact of the bar on review is very slight, and probably 
nonexistent, because the whole procedure is voluntary. Therefore, an argument 
that the agency failed to comply with the NRA is almost certainly doomed to fail-
ure on the merits.85 The bar on bringing the claim in the first place is a more effi-
cient route to the same result. This justification turns entirely on the voluntary 
and partial nature of reg-neg under the NRA; under a more robust or mandatory 
reg-neg regime, it would disappear. 
The third possible justification is the weakest of the three. Conceivably, it 
rests on the idea that the reg-neg is not the "real" process since it only produces a 
proposed rule. It is an entirely voluntary and ex ante addition, prior to the re-
quired APA notice-and-comment process. Accordingly, any and all errors can be 
deemed harmless. Since it is legally unobjectionable to have no process at all, 
there can be no complaint about an inadequate process. Something is better than 
nothing, and any defects can be cured through the regular notice-and-comment 
proceeding. This argument is quite flawed, a classic, mistaken greater-includes-
the-lesser argument.86 Defects in the antecedent process cannot be so easily dis-
missed. Agency and stakeholder commitment to a consensus rule, even if it is 
formally only a proposal, really does affect the final outcome. Indeed, that is 
precisely the point.87 All that said, it remains the case that the argument for strong 
83. See, e.g., Center for Law & Ed. v. U.S. Dep't of Ed., 209 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106-08 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(denying review of composition of negotiated rulemaking committee), aff'd on other grounds, 396 
F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the composition of 
the committee). This case actually arose under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), which re-
quires the Department of Education to "use a negotiated rulemaking process" when promulgating 
certain regulations. 20 U.S.C. § 6571 (b)(3)(A) (2006). The process "shall not be subject to the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, but shall otherwise follow the provisions of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act 
of 1990." Id. § 6571 (b)(4). On appeal, Judge Edwards, while agreeing with the majority that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing, wrote separately to explain that the NRA's bar on challenges to the composition 
of the committee did not apply. In his view, the relevant statute was the NCLBA, which itself con-
tained no such prohibition and which did not incorporate the entire NRA by reference but simply 
required the Department to employ certain procedures set out in the NRA. Id. at 1163-64 (Edwards, J., 
concurring). The majority did not address this issue. 
84. See 135 Cong. Rec. SI0,060 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Senator C. Levin) (stating 
that the provision was intended "to allow agencies to use negotiated rulemaking without the delays and 
procedural problems that might arise if judicial review of intermediate agency actions were available"). 
85. See, e.g., Texas Office of Pub. Utility Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313,327 (5th Cir. 2001) (reject-
ing argument that agency's ex parte contacts violated the NRA, since nothing required the agency to 
comply with the NRA in the first place). 
86. See generally Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the 
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227 (analyzing the pitfalls of greater-includes-the-lesser arguments). 
87. Choo, supra note 22, at 1116-17; William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in 
Administrative Law-Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 195-96 (2009) 
(criticizing the extent to which the agency is, as a practical matter, bound by the committee consensus). 
As Phil Harter has written, somewhat ominously, with regard to the agency's authority to propose or 
promulgate a rule different from the committee consensus: 
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procedural review would be more compelling if the process began and ended with 
the negotiation. 
For the above reasons, the fact that the NRA does not permit judicial policing 
of compliance with its procedures does not, in itself, argue strongly against such a 
judicial role as a general proposition. The NRA bar fits with the fact that the 
NRA is a rather dilute form of collaborative governance--an add-on to, rather 
than a substitute for, traditional agency decision-making. In a real collaborative 
governance regime, judicial scrutiny of procedural validity would be essential. 
That leaves one final issue. In most settings, procedural review with teeth 
presents a basic problem: what procedures will the court enforce? To the extent 
there are specific statutory requirements, this is not an issue. But for the express 
prohibition, for example, courts could easily enforce the requirements of the 
NRA.88 But for collaborative undertakings without a statutory basis (i.e., just 
about everything else) there are, by definition, no statutory requirements for courts 
to enforce. Nor is the APA relevant. Most agency decisions arising from colla-
borative processes count as informal adjudications under the APA, for which there 
are almost no required procedures. 89 Thus, it would be necessary for courts to 
develop an administrative common law, not unlike the development of the "paper 
hearing" in the 1970s. This would be deeply problematic. Most obviously, Ver-
mont Yankee90 stands in the way. There, the Supreme Court made clear that 
courts lack the authority to develop procedural requirements that are not imposed 
by the AP A, another statute, or the Constitution. 91 The fact that judges think cer-
tain procedures are important to fair and sound outcomes is neither here nor there. 
In addition, the Court's reasoning is pretty strong in this setting. Vermont Yankee 
asserts that agencies are in a better position than are courts to determine what 
supplementary procedures will be useful.92 Courts have little experience with 
collaborative governance; they may even have a sort of "anti-expertise" if they are 
drawn toward, and biased in favor of, the adversarial processes with which they 
are familiar and through which they function . 
While the agency likely has the legal authority to change its mind, it should take the agreement, 
and its commitments under the agreement, very seriously lest it both develop an immediate polit-
ical problem for itself: the participants would understandably be irked at spending considerable 
resources only to have the agency jilt them and others might be reluctant to participate in the fu-
ture if the agency were to regard their contributions so callously. In short, the agency should have 
a very good reason for changing its mind and should do so in only very unusual situations. 
Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Government Policy: Better Decisions Through Democratic Synergy, in 
REGULATION EcONOMIQUE ET DEMOCRATIE (Martine Lombard ed., 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=9l2293, at *23 (subscription required). 
88. Though some significant problems would arise. For example, what proof is permissible or neces-
sary to show consensus? Formal agreement? Or a direct inquiry into what everyone thought? And what 
level of agreement counts as consensus? 
89. Formal adjudications (i.e., those that are required to be conducted on the record after opportunity 
for a hearing) are subject to full trial-type procedures under sections 554, 556, and 557; formal rule-
makings are subject to the basic rulemaking procedures of section 553, with the written comments 
required by 553(c) replaced by a hearing under sections 556 and 557; informal rulemakings must 
follow the requirements of section 553. But informal adjudications have no procedural requirements 
other than the minor and haphazard requirements for all agency actions imposed by section 555. See 
generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (2006). 
90. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
91. Id. at 543-48. 
92. Id. at 543-45. 
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IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Agency Incentives 
The true believer will seek to create incentives to pursue reg-neg. The true 
believer herself does not need incentives; true belief does the trick. But it will be 
important to create incentives for those who may view the world differently. One 
incentive for the agency to pursue reg-neg would be to reduce the amount of scru-
tiny to which the rule is subject.93 The agency wants to produce rules with mini-
mum costs and maximum survivability. Whether reg-neg reduces or increases 
costs, either in the short run or the long, has been the subject of significant empiri-
cal debate.94 But the relevant costs include not only the burdens of the rule-
making process itself but also the costs of defending the resulting action.95 If 
judicial review is unavailable or perfunctory, then the costs of defense are re-
duced. More importantly, survivability is increased. One of the expectations for 
reg-neg was that judicial review would be less common because the obvious chal-
lengers would not be unhappy. This hope could be made into a mandate. Again, 
consider the extreme version: if rules adopted through ordinary notice and com-
ment received traditional judicial scrutiny but those adopted through reg-neg were 
immune from judicial review, that would be a powerful incentive to pursue the 
latter procedure. 
B. Private Parties 
Rules about judicial review also affect the incentives for private parties. It is 
pure speculation, but it seems plausible that if judicial review is limited or un-
available, the negotiating process will be taken more seriously and run more 
smoothly. Knowing that the negotiation is their one shot, the stakeholders are 
93. David Fontana's entire justification for highly deferential review of democracy index rulemak-
ing is that it would create an incentive for agencies to pursue it. Fontana, supra note 28. 
94. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip 
Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J . 386, 414, 416 (2001); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The 
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1278, 1284, 1309 (1997); 
Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 179, 195-202 (2005); Siobhan Mee, Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer 
Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213 (1997). 
95. City of Portland v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 507 F.3d 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007), was a challenge to 
an EPA drinking water regulation that began with a negotiated rulemaking. The proposed rule grew out 
of the negotiation and tracked the stakeholders ' suggestions; the final rule diverged. Petitioners argued 
that EPA had failed to provide adequate notice of what the final rule might include, suggesting that 
because the proposal had retlected the stakeholder consensus, they had no reason lo suspect that mea-
ningful changes might yet be made. In other words, the suggestion was that more detailed notice to let 
interested parties know their interests were at stake would be required if the proposed rule resulted 
from a negotiation. The D.C. Circuit tlatly rejected the argument, partly because it had no statutory 
basis, and partly because it would discourage agency use of negotiated rulemaking, contrary to Con-
gress's stated desire to see more of it. Id. at 715. Thus, the court was aware that stricter review would 
in tum mean more burdensome procedures, which would discourage the use of reg-neg. For a similar 
outcome, also emphasizing the agency ' s freedom to modify the agreed-upon proposed rule, see Natural 
Res . Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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more likely to choose to participate and to work hard to make the negotiation a 
success. 
[T]he incentive for stakeholders to participate is likely to increase when 
the collaborative process is the exclusive forum for decision making. In 
[ one instance studied by the authors,] successful collaboration ensued af-
ter the court refused to invalidate the [agency action]. This ruling pre-
vented the courts from being used as an alternative venue.96 
On the other hand, if stakeholders know that judicial review, particularly 
hard-look review, is available, they might just boycott the whole negotiation and 
then attack it after the fact. A decade ago, Jody Freeman made this point: 
To pursue the promise of collaboration glimpsed in the reg-neg and XL 
examples above, agencies must presumptively commit to agreements de-
veloped in these processes, and courts must presumptively defer to them. 
If not, participants will never engage in the prolonged negotiation and 
planning required to produce either a consensus rule or a [Final Project 
Agreement]. The proliferation of collaborative experiments, absent pre-
sumptive deference to the rules or agreements reached, may lead to a fru-
strating cycle of agency innovation and judicial reversal, which will ulti-
mately amount to little, if any, change.97 
Alternatively, it may be important to a successful process that judicial review 
be available because it creates incentives for parties to take the proceedings se-
riously, follow the rules, and try to reach consensus so as to avoid judicial review 
or, more seriously, judicial reversal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has been written largely from the perspective of a collaborative 
governance true believer. That is not because I am one in fact. As I said in the 
introduction, my own views are disappointingly agnostic. But that approach 
helps, I hope, to illustrate the issues. I could also have written this article from the 
point of view of the collaborative governance skeptic. The story would then be 
turned on its head. Reg-neg would be described as having all the pathologies of 
the legislative process without the critical saving grace of electoral accountability, 
amounting to nothing but exactly the sort of delegation to private entities of which 
courts have always been rightly skeptical. There would be every reason to be 
concerned about capture, the sacrifice of expertise and facts on the altar of prefe-
rence and private interest, and incoherent outcomes. On that account, courts 
would have a critical role in limiting the scope of collaborations to statutorily 
defined boundaries, and rigorously scrutinizing outcomes on the merits. Ready 
96. Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. Pue. 
ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 543, 552 (2008). 
97. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. I, 92 
( 1997); see also Harter, supra note 38, at 54. 
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availability of especially intrusive judicial review could be justified as a disincen-
tive for collaborative governance. Indeed, if Congress really wanted to discourage 
reg-neg, it could create the position of Public Advocate in the federal government, 
and authorize (require?) her to petition for review of any negotiated rule.98 
The point is that one's view of the appropriate role for the courts depends en-
tirely on one's views about collaborative governance. To date, collaborative go-
vernance, especially in the rule-making setting, has been a modest adjustment 
rather than a fundamental alteration. There has not been a whole-hearted com-
mitment to it. Not surprisingly, then, courts have continued in pretty much the 
same place with regard to judicial review. If a sort of tinkering at the edges is all 
we have in mind, then judicial review should continue to look as it has in the past. 
If we go more boldly down the collaborative governance path, convinced of its 
merits, then traditional judicial review for anything other than procedural validity 
would be out of place. 
98. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27EE-59(b) (West, Westlaw current through L. 2009, c. 167, and J.R. 
No. 11) ("The Division of Public Interest Advocacy [ within the Office of the New Jersey Public Advo-
cate] may represent and protect the public interest by . . . instituting litigation on behalf of a broad 
public interest when authorized to do so by the Public Advocate."). 
